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The Independence Standards Board was formed in 1997 with the
mission “to establish standards applicable to audits of public
companies in order to serve the public interest and to protect and
promote investors’ confidence in the securities markets.” One of its
objectives was to:
Develop a conceptual framework for independence
applicable to audits of public companies which will serve as
the foundation for the development of principles-based
independence standards.
To assist in developing a conceptual framework, the Board engaged
Henry R. Jaenicke, the C.D. Clarkson Professor of Accounting at
Drexel University, to serve as Director of the project, and Alan S.
Glazer, Professor of Business Administration at Franklin & Marshall
College, to serve as Associate Director. Professors Jaenicke and
Glazer worked with Arthur Siegel, Susan McGrath, and Richard H.
Towers of the ISB staff, a broad-based project task force formed to
advise on the project, a Board-oversight task force, and the Board
itself. Professor Thomas W. Dunfee, the Joseph Kolodny Professor
of Social Responsibility and vice-dean for the undergraduate
division of the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania,
also assisted on the project. During the course of the project the
Board issued a discussion memorandum on auditor independence
(DM) and an exposure draft of a Statement of Independence
Concepts (ED). On July 9 , 2001, the Board with the concurrence of
the SEC and the AICPA passed a resolution of dissolution effective
July 31, 2001. At that meeting, the Board also directed the staff of
the ISB to complete its present work on the draft of the conceptual
framework and to make that draft publicly available.

1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775
(212) 596-6133 . fax (212) 596-6137
Web site: www.cpaindependence.org

The conceptual framework presented here represents the draft of a Statement of Independence
Concepts that Professors Jaenicke, Glazer and Dunfee and the ISB staff submit for that
purpose. The document reflects the thinking of the staff, informed by:
•
•
•

Board deliberations and its preliminary conclusions reflected in the DM and the
ED;
comments received from respondents on the DM and ED; and
input from the project task force, the Board oversight task force, and other
interested parties on drafts of the DM and ED as well as on an earlier draft of this
document.

Of course, had the Board met to consider this document, it might have made substantive
changes before authorizing its issuance as the Board’s Statement of Independence Concepts.
Nevertheless in its present state I am confident that this staff document will make a substantial
contribution to members of the accounting profession and others who will in the future be
required to grapple with the issues that arise from a reflective consideration of auditor
independence.
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A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence

SUMMARY
This document describes a conceptual framework for auditor independence to be used:
•

as a foundation for developing principles-based independence standards,

• as a guide for resolving independence issues in the absence of standards or other
rules, and
• as a resource to help investors, other users of financial information, and other
interested parties better understand how the independence of auditors contributes to
audit quality.
The framework contains four interrelated components: a definition of auditor
independence, a goal of auditor independence, concepts, and basic principles.
The framework defines auditor independence as both (a) independence of mind—
freedom from the effects of threats to auditor independence that would be sufficient to
compromise an auditor’s objectivity and (b) independence in appearance—absence of
activities, relationships, and other circumstances that would lead well-informed investors
and other users reasonably to conclude that there is an unacceptably high risk that an
auditor lacks independence of mind. Compliance with rules and regulations governing
auditor independence is necessary, but may not be sufficient, for an auditor to be
considered independent under the definition. An auditor also must be able, and wellinformed investors and other users must expect the auditor to be able, to overcome the
effects of threats that would compromise objectivity.
Rather than focusing on independence as an end in itself, the framework describes the
goal of auditor independence as helping to ensure quality audits in order to support
investors’ and other users’ reliance on the financial reporting process and facilitate the
optimal allocation of capital.
The concepts of auditor independence described in the framework comprise a risk model
for auditor independence:
• Threats to auditor independence are pressures and other factors that impair an
auditor’s objectivity. The framework discusses five types of threats to auditor
independence—self-interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity (or trust), and
intimidation—that may be posed by various activities, relationships, or other
circumstances.

• Safeguards to auditor independence are controls that mitigate the effects of
threats. The framework provides examples of safeguards that exist in the present
audit environment or that could be put in place in response to threats to auditor
independence.
• Independence risk is the likelihood that an auditor’s objectivity (a) would be
compromised or (b) reasonably would appear compromised to well-informed
investors and other users. The significance of a threat is the extent to which the
threat increases independence risk and the effectiveness of a safeguard is the extent
to which the safeguard decreases independence risk. The framework provides
examples of factors that affect the significance of threats and the effectiveness of
safeguards.
The basic principles serve as guidelines to assist individuals and organizations that make
independence decisions in analyzing independence issues in a wide variety of
circumstances.
• Independence decision makers should consider the level of independence risk
by analyzing the types and significance of threats to auditor independence and the
types and effectiveness of safeguards, assess whether the level of independence risk
is acceptably low, and apply appropriate safeguards if it is not. The framework
specifies that only a very low level of independence risk should be considered
acceptable.
• Independence decision makers should conclude that the benefits of reduced
independence risk from applying safeguards exceed their costs. Although the
benefits of reduced independence risk and the costs of safeguards are often difficult
to identify and quantify, independence decision makers should consider them when
assessing the acceptability of the level of independence risk.
• Independence decision makers should consider the views of investors, other
users, and others with an interest in the integrity of financial reporting when
considering the level of independence risk, when assessing its acceptability, and
when considering the costs and benefits of applying safeguards.
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A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence
INTRODUCTION—SCOPE AND CONTENT
1.

The principal purposes of this conceptual framework for auditor independence1are:
a.
to help the Independence Standards Board (ISB or Board) meet its responsibilities
to set sound and consistent standards by providing direction and structure for resolving
independence issues;
b.
to assist other independence decision makers in resolving questions about
independence;
c.
to help investors, other users of financial information, and other interested parties
understand the nature, significance, and limitations of auditor independence; and
d.
to focus debate and provide a common language for discussions about auditor
independence issues, thereby helping interested parties contribute to the development and
application of, and better understand the rationale and process underlying, ISB standards.

2.
This conceptual framework does not establish rules for auditor independence. Rather, it
specifies various components—a definition, a goal, concepts, and basic principles—that together
form a conceptual framework. This framework serves as a foundation for the Board to develop
principles-based standards to clarify and improve authoritative guidance and current practice.
The framework also should assist other independence decision makers in analyzing and reaching
conclusions about what is acceptable in the absence of applicable authoritative guidance. The
Board expects, over time, to identify and reconsider any existing authoritative guidance that
conflicts with this framework. Until any required changes are made, the framework should not
be used to justify departures from existing guidance. Appendices to this framework describe the
major steps in developing the conceptual framework and the basis for the conclusions expressed
in it.

DEFINING AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
3.
Quality audits improve the reliability and enhance the credibility of the financial
reporting process, thereby contributing to its usefulness and to the optimal allocation of capital,
which serves the public interest. Quality audits are audits performed in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). These standards provide guidance in making
significant decisions regarding planning the audit, gathering evidence, and communicating and

1Words and phrases defined in the Glossary are set in italic type the first time they are used in the conceptual
framework.
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reporting audit findings. The exercise of sound judgment is an important feature of GAAS, and
independence helps ensure that an auditor has the requisite objectivity when making significant
audit decisions.
4.
The quality of an audit depends on many factors, including the personal attributes that
individual auditors bring to an engagement, the policies and procedures of the auditing firms in
which they work, and the attitudes and actions of the management of those firms, sometimes
referred to as the “tone at the top.” In addition, various self-regulatory and public regulatory
bodies help ensure audit quality. The independence of auditors and the controls that help ensure
their independence are only one source, albeit an important source, of quality audits.
5.
Auditor independence is both (a) independence of mind—freedom from the effects
of threats to auditor independence that would be sufficient to compromise an auditor’s
objectivity and (b) independence in appearance—absence of activities, relationships, and
other circumstances that would lead well-informed investors and other users reasonably to
conclude that there is an unacceptably high risk that an auditor lacks independence of
mind.2
6.
The definition of auditor independence recognizes that auditor independence has two
dimensions—independence of mind and independence in appearance. Independence of mind is a
personal attribute of an auditor that cannot be directly assessed by investors and other users. The
definition, therefore, also includes independence in appearance, which is the absence of those
activities, relationships, and other circumstances that would lead well-informed investors and
other users reasonably to conclude that there is an unacceptably high risk that an auditor’s
objectivity is compromised.
7.
The definition clarifies that an auditor need not be free from all threats that may impair3
an auditor’s objectivity. Safeguards to auditor independence may mitigate the effects of threats
by eliminating the threats themselves—by prohibiting the activities, relationships, or other
circumstances from which threats arise—or by lessening the severity of their effects by other
means. Independence requires an auditor to be free only from the residual effects of those
threats, after the application of safeguards, that are at a level sufficient to compromise, or that
well-informed investors or other users reasonably would conclude is sufficient to compromise,
an auditor’s objectivity. That level represents a threshold that distinguishes between when an
auditor is independent and when an auditor is not.
8.
Threats that may compromise an auditor’s objectivity arise both from a wide variety of
activities, relationships, and other circumstances as well as from various personal qualities and
characteristics of auditors that may be sources of bias. Regulatory and standard-setting bodies
issue authoritative guidance that limits or proscribes certain activities, relationships, and other
circumstances because they believe that those activities, relationships, and other circumstances
2 The components of the conceptual framework are set in boldface type.
3 As used in this conceptual framework, an auditor’s objectivity is “impaired” if it is negatively affected to any
degree; objectivity is “compromised” if the impairment rises to the level of precluding unbiased audit decisions.
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represent potential sources of bias for auditors generally, even though some individual auditors
may be impervious to the effects of the threats that arise in those circumstances. Authoritative
guidance applies to all auditors because regulatory and standard-setting bodies believe that it is
reasonable to expect that an auditor’s objectivity will be compromised in those circumstances.
Authoritative guidance is designed to help ensure independence of both mind and appearance.
Accordingly, noncompliance with authoritative guidance might not preclude a particular auditor
from being objective, but it would preclude the auditor from being independent.
9.
The definition, however, means that auditor independence is more than just compliance
with authoritative guidance—not every threat that may be a source of bias or that would lead
well-informed investors and other users reasonably to conclude that there is an unacceptably high
risk that an auditor lacks objectivity can be identified and covered by a rule. To be independent,
an auditor must be able, and a reasonable well-informed investor or other user would expect the
auditor to be able, to overcome the effects of threats that would compromise objectivity.
Accordingly, even if existing authoritative guidance permits, or does not limit or forbid, a
particular activity, relationship, or other circumstance—for example, auditing a company in
which the chief financial officer is the auditor’s close friend—an auditor is not independent if his
or her objectivity is compromised, or if well-informed investors and other users reasonably
would conclude that there is an unacceptably high risk that the auditor’s objectivity is
compromised as a result of that activity, relationship, or other circumstance. In other words,
compliance with authoritative guidance is a necessary, but may not be a sufficient, condition for
independence.
10.
Assessing the independence of auditors requires independence decision makers to
consider:
a.
threats that might result in the inability to be objective and the significance of
those threats;
b.
safeguards that might reduce the impact of those threats and the effectiveness of
those safeguards; and
c.
the likelihood that an auditor’s objectivity would be compromised by the effects
of unmitigated threats, or reasonably would appear compromised to well-informed
investors and other users—defined in this framework as independence risk.
These concepts are discussed in paragraphs 14-24. Resolving auditor independence issues also
requires independence decision makers to consider how best to meet the goal of auditor
independence.

GOAL OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
11.
The goal of auditor independence is to support reliance on the financial reporting
process by investors and other users and to facilitate the optimal allocation of capital.
12.
The focus of the goal is on independence as one aspect of quality audits—audits that
improve the reliability and enhance the credibility of the financial reporting process. Reliable
and credible financial information, in turn, helps ensure that investors and other users have
3

confidence in that information. Those outcomes are in the public interest because they help
investors, creditors, and other users make more informed resource-allocation decisions.
13.
Independence decision makers should make decisions that help ensure that auditors are,
and that well-informed investors and other users would reasonably believe that auditors are,
independent. If auditors are sufficiently free from bias but investors and other users do not
believe that they are, audits may not enhance the credibility of financial information and, as a
result, investors or other users may place less reliance on audited financial information.
Independence decision makers, however, should not make decisions that might enhance the
credibility of financial information but which have unintended consequences that decrease its
reliability. Credible financial information that lacks underlying reliability is undesirable and, in
the long term, self-defeating. Therefore, the goal contemplates well-placed user reliance and
confidence.

AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE CONCEPTS
14.

This section describes three concepts related to auditor independence:
a.
threats to auditor independence;
b.
safeguards to auditor independence; and
c.
independence risk.
These concepts, together with the basic principles of auditor independence described later in this
framework, are intended to help independence decision makers analyze auditor independence
issues.

Threats to Auditor Independence
15.
Threats to auditor independence are pressures and other factors that impair an
auditor’s objectivity.
16.
Threats may arise from various types of activities, relationships, and other circumstances.
Identifying the types of threats posed by specific activities, relationships, or other circumstances
helps independence decision makers understand the nature of those threats and their potential
impact on auditor independence.
17.
The following list provides examples of the types of threats that can lead to biased audit
decisions. Although the list is not mutually exclusive or exhaustive, it illustrates the wide variety
of threat types that independence decision makers need to consider when analyzing auditor
independence issues.
a.
Self-interest threats—threats that arise from auditors acting in their own interest.
Self-interests include auditors’ emotional, financial, or other personal interests. Auditors
may favor, consciously or subconsciously, those self-interests over their interest in
performing a quality audit. For example, auditors’ relationships with auditees create a
financial self-interest because auditees pay the auditors’ fees. Auditors also have a
4

financial self-interest if they own stock in an auditee and may have an emotional or
financial self-interest if an employment relationship exists between an auditor’s spouse
and an auditee.
b.
Self-review threats—threats that arise from auditors reviewing their own work or
the work done by others in their firm. It may be more difficult to evaluate without bias
one’s own work, or that of one’s firm, than the work of someone else or of some other
firm. Therefore, a self-review threat may arise when auditors review judgments and
decisions they, or others in their firm, have made.
c.
Advocacy threats—threats that arise from auditors or others in their firm
promoting or advocating for or against an auditee or its position or opinion rather than
serving as unbiased attestors of the auditees’ financial information. Such a threat may be
present, for example, if auditors or others in the auditing firm serve as promoters for an
auditee’s securities.
d.
Familiarity (or trust) threats—threats that arise from auditors being influenced by
a close relationship with an auditee. Such a threat is present when auditors are not
sufficiently skeptical of an auditee’s assertions and, as a result, too readily accept an
auditee’s viewpoint because of their familiarity with or trust in the auditee. For example,
a familiarity threat may arise when an auditor has a particularly close or long-standing
personal or professional relationship with an auditee.
e.
Intimidation threats—threats that arise from auditors being, or believing that they
are being, overtly or covertly coerced by auditees or by other interested parties. Such a
threat may arise, for example, if an auditing firm is threatened with replacement over a
disagreement about an auditee’s application of an accounting principle, or if an auditor
believes that an auditee’s expression of client dissatisfaction would damage his or her
career within the firm.
18.
The significance of a threat may have both probability and magnitude dimensions, and
threats can be significant individually or in combination. The significance of a threat depends on
many factors, including the nature of the activity, relationship, or other circumstance creating the
threat; the force with which pressure is exerted or felt; the importance of the matter that is the
subject of the activity, relationship, or other circumstance; the position and level of responsibility
of the persons involved; and the strength of the integrity of the persons involved. Independence
decision makers should evaluate these and other factors when assessing threats to auditor
independence posed by various activities, relationships, and other circumstances.

Safeguards to Auditor Independence
19.

Safeguards to auditor independence are controls that mitigate the effects of threats.

20.

Safeguards take a variety of forms, including:
a.
authoritative guidance that prohibits or restricts certain activities, relationships, or
other circumstances or that requires disclosure of such activities, relationships, or other
circumstances;
b.
auditing firm policies, procedures, and practices;
5

c.
institutional arrangements, such as the threat of disciplinary action and legal
liability;
d.
environmental conditions, such as the value that auditing firms and individual
auditors place on their reputations; and
e.
aspects of corporate governance and auditing firm culture, such as effective
communications between audit committees and auditors, and appropriate “tone at the top”
of auditees and auditing firms.
Because effective safeguards help ensure that auditors are objective in the presence of threats to
auditor independence, independence decision makers should consider existing safeguards as well
as new safeguards that could be put in place to mitigate those threats.
21.
Different safeguards may mitigate different types of threats, and one safeguard may
mitigate several types of threats simultaneously. For example:
a.
self-interest threats may be mitigated by, among other safeguards, prohibitions
against certain financial interests and family relationships between auditors and auditees,
restrictions on the percentage of total fees earned from one auditee, and auditing firm
disclosures to the audit committee of all services provided to the auditee;
b.
self-review threats may be mitigated by, among other safeguards, prohibitions
against auditors acting in the capacity of auditee management;
c.
advocacy threats may be mitigated by, among other safeguards, prohibitions
against and limitations on auditors providing certain services for auditees that involve
advocacy roles;
d.
familiarity threats may be mitigated by, among other safeguards, mandatory
periodic replacement of engagement partners and restrictions on certain employment
relationships between auditors’ family members and auditees; and
e.
intimidation threats may be mitigated by, among other safeguards, concurring
partner reviews, internal consultation requirements, and an appropriate “tone at the top”
in both auditing firms and auditees.
22.
Safeguards may be effective either individually or in combination. The effectiveness of a
safeguard depends on many factors, including whether it is suitably designed to meet its
objectives, how it is applied, the consistency with which it is applied, by whom it is applied, and
to whom it is applied. Independence decision makers should evaluate these and other factors
when assessing safeguards that exist or can be put in place in response to specific activities,
relationships, and other circumstances that pose threats to auditor independence.

Independence Risk
23.
Independence risk is the likelihood that an auditor’s objectivity (a) would be
compromised or (b) reasonably would appear compromised to well-informed investors and
other users.
24.
Independence risk increases in the presence of threats to auditor independence and is
reduced by safeguards. Independence decision makers should evaluate the significance of threats
6

posed by activities, relationships, and other circumstances and the effectiveness of safeguards to
determine whether additional safeguards are necessary to reduce independence risk. Paragraphs
25-38 describe basic principles that independence decision makers should use to consider and
assess the level of independence risk.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
25.

This section discusses three basic principles of auditor independence:
a.
considering the level of independence risk and assessing its acceptability;
b.
considering benefits and costs; and
c.
considering the views of investors and other interested parties.
The basic principles serve as guidelines for independence decision makers in analyzing auditor
independence issues in a wide variety of circumstances.

Considering the Level of Independence Risk and Assessing its Acceptability
26.
Independence decision makers should (a) consider the level of independence risk by
analyzing threats and their significance and safeguards and their effectiveness, (b) assess
whether that level is acceptably low, and (c) apply appropriate safeguards if it is not.
27.
This basic principle describes a process by which independence decision makers should
analyze threats and safeguards to consider the level of independence risk that results from various
activities, relationships, or other circumstances. Although it cannot be measured precisely, the
level of independence risk for any specific activity, relationship, or other circumstance can be
described as a position on a continuum that ranges from “no independence risk,” where
compromised objectivity is virtually impossible, to “maximum independence risk,” where
compromised objectivity is virtually certain. When considering the level of independence risk,
independence decision makers should consider the views of well-informed investors and other
users of financial information.
28.
This basic principle also describes the need for independence decision makers to assess
the acceptability of the level of independence risk that arises from specific activities,
relationships, and other circumstances. That evaluation requires them to judge whether existing
safeguards adequately mitigate threats to auditor independence posed by those activities,
relationships, or other circumstances. If they do not, independence decision makers should
decide which additional or alternative safeguards (including prohibition) would reduce
independence risk to an acceptably low level. When assessing the acceptability of independence
risk, independence decision makers also should consider the aggregate risk arising from different
threats because their effects may be cumulative. The acceptability of a level of independence risk
arising from different activities, relationships, and other circumstances will vary based on an
analysis of costs and benefits and the views of well-informed investors and other users of
financial information.
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29.
Given certain factors in the environment in which audits take place—for example, that
the auditor is paid by the auditee—independence risk cannot be completely mitigated and,
therefore, independence decision makers always accept some risk that auditors’ objectivity may
be compromised. Nevertheless, independence decision makers should consider only a very low
level of independence risk to be acceptable. Only such a small likelihood of compromised
objectivity is consistent with both the definition and the goal of auditor independence.
30.
Some threats to auditor independence may affect only certain individuals or groups
within an auditing firm, and the significance of some threats may be different for different
individuals or groups. In determining whether independence risk is at an acceptably low level,
independence decision makers should identify the individuals or groups affected by threats to
auditor independence and the significance of those threats. Different types of safeguards may be
appropriate for different individuals and groups depending on their ability to influence the
outcome of the audit.

Considering Benefits and Costs
31.
Independence decision makers should conclude that the benefits of reduced
independence risk from applying safeguards exceed their costs.
32.
Although the benefits of reduced independence risk and costs of safeguards are often
difficult to identify and quantify, independence decision makers should consider them when
assessing the acceptability of the level of independence risk. Because the independence of
auditors is important not only in its own right but also in helping ensure that broad public interest
objectives are met, independence decision makers should consider costs and benefits to society at
large, not just those they may incur or enjoy themselves. Similarly, independence decision
makers should consider indirect effects and potential unintended consequences that go beyond
the direct impact of specific safeguards. It is not appropriate, however, to ignore a mandated
safeguard based on a belief that its costs exceed its benefits.
33.
The benefits of applying safeguards result from reduced independence risk. Such
reductions help to ensure auditor independence, providing positive direct and indirect benefits
that accrue to various parties. Examples of those benefits include:
a.
for investors and other users of financial information, auditor independence helps
ensure quality audits and the reliability of the financial reporting process, which also may
lead to increased confidence in that reliability. These benefits, in turn, help improve
investors’ and other users’ resource-allocation decisions, an outcome that is in the public
interest.
b.
for auditees, auditor independence helps reduce their cost of capital by reducing
the premium that investors and creditors demand as compensation for assuming the risk
that they will make incorrect decisions because the financial information used in making
those decisions contains material misstatements or omissions.
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c.
for auditees’ boards of directors, audit committees, and senior management,
auditor independence helps ensure the reliability of financial information prepared by
lower-level management.
d.
for auditees and auditors, auditor independence may help reduce litigation and
related costs resulting from alleged and actual situations involving unreliable financial
information.
e.
for individual auditors, auditing firms, and the auditing profession as a whole,
independence facilitates the discharge of their responsibility to conduct GAAS audits and
may help enhance their reputations and self-esteem.
34.
Various parties bear a variety of costs related to safeguards to auditor independence.
Direct costs include developing, maintaining, and enforcing safeguards, including the costs of
auditing firms’ independence-related quality controls and costs related to the systems of public
regulation and self-regulation of auditor independence. Indirect costs and unintended
consequences of safeguards include possible reductions in audit quality or other negative
outcomes that may result from safeguards that prohibit or restrict auditors’ activities and
relationships. For example, restrictions on auditing firm personnel’s investments and on
employment of their family members by auditees may reduce the attractiveness of auditing firms
as employers and thereby lead to reduced audit quality. The direct and indirect costs of
safeguards may be affected by many variables, including the number of individuals in a firm that
will be affected by a safeguard.

Considering Interested Parties' Views in Addressing Auditor Independence Issues
35.
Independence decision makers should consider the views of investors, other users,
and others with an interest in the integrity of financial reporting when considering the level
of independence risk, when assessing its acceptability, and when considering the costs and
benefits of applying safeguards.
36.
Because of its responsibility for issuing independence standards for all auditors of public
entities, the ISB’s process of considering interested parties’ views is more extensive than the
process used by other independence decision makers. The ISB’s due process provides
opportunities for extensive participation in its standard-setting by various parties, including
investors and other users, auditors, educators, regulators, and auditee management. By being
informed about the views of various types of individuals and groups, the ISB learns about threats
to independence and the potential effects of various safeguards on the reliability of financial
information, audit quality, and the broader goal of optimal capital allocation. The ISB also gains
insight about the views of well-informed investors and other users of financial information
concerning independence risk and its acceptability in specific circumstances.
37.
Supporting user reliance on the financial reporting process is an important component of
the goal of independence, and the framework’s basic principle to consider the level of
independence risk and assess its acceptability directs independence decision makers to consider
the beliefs of well-informed investors and other users at this point in their decision-making
9

process. Considering the views of well-informed investors and other users does not, however,
abrogate the ISB’s responsibility to exercise its own judgment in setting independence standards
that are consistent with both the definition and the goal of auditor independence and the
framework’s principle of assessing the acceptability of independence risk in light of costs and
benefits. Effective communication of ISB decisions, and of the reasoning that underlies them,
also may help ensure that investors and other users of financial information have confidence in
the ISB’s standard setting process and conclusions.
38.
In the absence of specific authoritative guidance, independence decision makers other
than the ISB should consider how well-informed investors and other users might view their
decisions about the level of independence risk, its acceptability, and the costs and benefits of
applying safeguards. Independence decision makers other than the ISB, however, may not have,
and would not be expected to have, the benefit of extensive due process in resolving auditor
independence issues.
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APPENDIX A—GLOSSARY
39.
This appendix contains definitions of certain terms or phrases used in this conceptual
framework.
Auditees
Entities whose financial information is being audited.
Auditor independence
Both (a) independence of mind—freedom from the effects of threats to auditor
independence that would be sufficient to compromise an auditor’s objectivity and (b)
independence in appearance—absence of activities, relationships, and other
circumstances that would lead well-informed investors and other users reasonably to
conclude that there is an unacceptably high risk that an auditor lacks independence of
mind.
Credibility
The quality of information that makes it believable.
Independence decision makers
Individuals, groups, and entities that make judgments about auditor independence issues.
Independence decision makers include:
• the ISB and other independence standard setters
• auditing firms in adopting independence policies and procedures in the absence of
existing authoritative guidance
• individual auditors in assessing their own independence and in making decisions when
faced with situations for which there is neither authoritative guidance nor firm policy
• the management, audit committees, and boards of directors of auditees in meeting their
responsibilities to retain auditors who are independent
• regulators in meeting their responsibilities to ensure the independence of auditors.
Independence Risk
The likelihood that an auditor’s objectivity (a) would be compromised or (b) reasonably
would appear compromised to well-informed investors and other users.
Objectivity
The ability to make unbiased audit decisions.
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Quality audit
An audit performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
Reliability
“The quality of information that assures that information is reasonably free from error
and bias and faithfully represents what it purports to represent.”4
Safeguards to Auditor Independence (Safeguards)
Controls that mitigate the effects of threats.
Threats to Auditor Independence (Threats)
Pressures and other factors that impair an auditor’s objectivity.
Users
Investors, creditors, audit committee members, analysts, and others who use audited
financial information in making investment, credit, and similar decisions.

4Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative
Characteristics o f Accounting Information (Stamford, CT: FASB, 1980), “Glossary of Terms.”
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APPENDIX B—BACKGROUND INFORMATION
40.
The ISB was formed in 1997 to establish standards governing the independence of
auditors of public entities. As part of its initial charge, the Board was given the task of
developing a conceptual framework for auditor independence on which future independence
standards could be based. Henry R. Jaenicke, the C. D. Clarkson Professor of Accounting at
Drexel University, served as Director, and Alan S. Glazer, Professor of Business Administration
at Franklin & Marshall College, served as Associate Director of the project.
41.
Discussion Memorandum (DM) 00-1, A Conceptual Frameworkfo r Auditor
Independence, was prepared with input from a broad-based project task force consisting of
representatives of investor groups, audit committee members, attorneys, regulators, other
independence standard setters, members of the auditing profession, corporate executives, and
academics specializing in ethics, accounting, auditing, and other business-related fields. A Board
oversight task force provided further direction and assisted in reviewing the DM. The DM was
considered by the Board at meetings on January 14 and February 17, 2000 and was released in
February 2000 for a public comment period that ended on May 31, 2000. Comments also were
solicited directly from specific individuals and groups in the academic, standard-setting, and
investor communities. Twenty-two comment letters were received.
42.
After considering these letters, and with further assistance from the oversight and project
task forces, an Exposure Draft (ED) of a proposed Statement of Independence Concepts was
developed. The ED was released in November 2000 for a public comment period that ended on
February 28, 2001. Comments were again solicited directly from specific individuals and
groups. Twenty-seven comment letters were received. On July 9, 2001, prior to its
consideration of the comments received on the ED, the Board with the concurrence of the SEC
and the AICPA passed a resolution of dissolution effective July 31, 2001. Professors Jaenicke,
Glazer, Dunfee,5 and the ISB staff (collectively, the staff) revised the ED based on comments
received, their own deliberations, and further assistance from project task force members and
other interested parties. The conceptual framework was issued on July 30, 2001 as a staff report.

5Professor Thomas W. Dunfee, who served as an advisor to the Board on ethical issues and the conceptual
framework project, is the Joseph Kolodny Professor of Social Responsibility and vice-dean for the undergraduate
division of the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania.
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APPENDIX C—BASIS FOR CONCLUSIONS
43.
This appendix discusses the issues considered by the Board, the project task force, and
the staff in arriving at conclusions about the conceptual framework. It describes the staff's
reasons for accepting certain views and for rejecting others and includes an explanation of
significant changes made to Exposure Draft (ED) 00-2, A Conceptual Framework for Auditor
Independence.
44.
The staff believes that the approach to analyzing auditor independence issues described in
this conceptual framework will be useful for independence decision makers. The approach
includes a definition that the staff believes most clearly describes auditor independence and a
goal describing the fundamental purpose of auditor independence. The other framework
components consist of concepts and basic principles to help independence decision makers:
a.
examine potential threats to auditor independence;
b.
consider the mitigating effects of safeguards;
c.
assess the risk that an auditor’s objectivity would be, or would reasonably appear
to well-informed investors and other users to be, compromised; and
d.
analyze whether the level of independence risk is acceptably low.

Defining Auditor Independence
45.
A definition provides a common language for all parties to use in discussing auditor
independence issues. The definition of auditor independence in paragraph 5 is based on a
combination of the personal attributes and the activities and relationships approaches discussed
in Section IV of Discussion Memorandum (DM) 00-1, A Conceptual Frameworkfor Auditor
Independence. The framework defines auditor independence as having two dimensions—
independence of mind and independence in appearance. Independence of mind—defined as
“freedom from the effects of threats to auditor independence that would be sufficient to
compromise an auditor’s objectivity”—is a personal attribute that helps ensure that auditors
perform quality audits. Independence in appearance—defined as the “absence of activities,
relationships, and other circumstances that would lead well-informed investors and other users
reasonably to conclude that there is an unacceptably high risk that an auditor lacks independence
of mind”—is included to acknowledge the importance to the capital markets of users’ beliefs
about auditor objectivity. A definition with these two dimensions also was supported by many
respondents to the ED, who noted that both aspects of auditor independence are included in the
approach used and under consideration by regulators and standard setters in the United States
and in other parts of the world.
46.
The staff believes that incorporating the reasonable conclusions of well-informed
investors and other users helps make the definition operational. Instead of describing auditor
independence purely as a personal attribute or state of mind that cannot be observed, measured,
or evaluated, a definition that incorporates investors’ and other users’ conclusions provides
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independence decision makers with a way to assess when auditors likely possess the personal
attribute of independence of mind.
47.
The staff considered defining auditor independence solely in terms of the absence of
certain activities and relationships. The staff acknowledges that there are some who believe that
those definitions are more useful to independence decision makers because they rely on
observable external indicators of a lack of independence. The staff concluded, however, that a
definition based solely on an activities and relationships approach that did not also include
independence of mind would be incomplete. A definition based solely on an activities and
relationships approach would indicate how independence can be demonstrated (i.e., by an auditor
not participating in certain activities or having certain relationships) but it would not describe
what independence represents (i.e., freedom from the effects of threats sufficient to compromise
objectivity).
48.
The definition describes independence in appearance in terms of the “risk” of
compromised objectivity. Well-informed investors and other users cannot observe how threats
affect a specific auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions, and individual auditors may
react differently to the same set of threats and safeguards. As a result, investors and other users
rely on independence decision makers to identify and analyze various activities, relationships,
and other circumstances that are sources of threats that can reasonably be expected to lead to an
unacceptably high risk of biased audit decisions and to apply appropriate safeguards to reduce
independence risk to an acceptably low level.
49.
Some respondents to the ED suggested that the Board define independence solely as the
absence of an unacceptable risk of biased audit decisions or of material bias. The staff
concluded, however, that these proposed definitions were incomplete because they do not
include consideration of how activities, relationships, and other circumstances appear to wellinformed investors and other users of financial statements. In the staff's view, such
consideration is necessary to help ensure that the goal of auditor independence is achieved—a
goal that includes helping to support user reliance on the financial reporting process.
50.
The staff included the phrase “that would lead well-informed investors and other users
reasonably to conclude” so that the definition would explicitly state whose views independence
decision makers should consider when resolving auditor independence issues. The staff
acknowledges that determining what well-informed investors and other users might reasonably
conclude may be difficult. The staff believes that such a process involves a good faith
determination by independence decision makers about how well-informed investors and other
users might view an issue. The staff recognizes, however, that even well-informed investors and
other users are likely to have divergent views about specific independence issues. The staff
decided, therefore, that in addition to specifying explicitly in the definition whose beliefs are to
be considered, the conceptual framework should include a basic principle (see paragraphs 35-38)
that describes how the views of interested parties should be considered in addressing auditor
independence issues.
51.
The phrase “freedom from the effects of threats to auditor independence that would be
sufficient to compromise” in the definition means that independence does not require complete
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freedom from the effects of all threats that an auditor may face—that is not possible. Biases
arise from an individual auditor’s background, education, and experiences and are part of human
nature; they can be either conscious or subconscious and can be either in favor of or against
specific individuals, groups, organizations, ideas, or principles. Nevertheless, threats posed by
certain activities, relationships, and other circumstances may endanger the quality of audits if
they are sufficient to compromise an auditor’s objectivity. The definition of auditor
independence in paragraph 5 means that only pressures and other factors, after the mitigating
effects of safeguards, that rise to a level that prevent, or can reasonably be expected to prevent,
an auditor from making unbiased audit decisions would preclude an auditor from being
independent.
52.
Several respondents to the ED expressed concern about a definition that could be
misconstrued as requiring absolute freedom from threats or that did not consider the effect of
safeguards in mitigating threats. The staff considered whether the definition in the ED could be
misinterpreted to mean that independence is unconditional or absolute—that is, that
independence requires an auditor to be completely free from threats. The staff believes the
definition in the ED describes a state that an auditor can attain, namely, the ability to make, and
to be seen as making, unbiased audit decisions. Nevertheless, the staff added the phrases “the
effects o f ’ and “sufficient to” to the definition in paragraph 5 to emphasize that auditors do not
have to be completely free from all threats to satisfy the definition of independence.
53.
As noted in footnote 3, the staff used the term “compromise” in the definition to mean
that an auditor’s objectivity has been affected to such an extent that the auditor can no longer
make unbiased audit decisions. The staff considered using the more widely-used term “impair”
instead of “compromise” in this context, but believes that compromise more clearly implies that
the effect of a threat to auditor independence must rise to a level where an unbiased decision
cannot be made. Auditors are affected by a wide variety of threats that may reduce (that is,
impair) their objectivity to some degree. Only when the impairment rises to a level at which the
auditor cannot make unbiased audit decisions, however, does the auditor lose his or her
independence of mind.
54.
The staff decided not to include the phrase “independence in fact” in the definition.
Including that phrase would have suggested that independence is something that can be
objectively determined or unequivocally demonstrated. The staff believes that, although the
phrase has been widely used in the literature, it can easily be misinterpreted because it suggests a
level of certainty or measurability about the existence of auditor independence that cannot be
achieved.

Goal of Auditor Independence
55.
A goal of auditor independence serves as a guide in setting standards. It also assists
independence decision makers in analyzing auditor independence issues when standards or other
authoritative guidance do not address particular circumstances that may compromise an auditor’s
objectivity.
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56.
The goal in paragraph 11 does not focus on independence as an end in itself but on
independence as a means to support investor and other user reliance on the financial reporting
process and to facilitate the optimal allocation of capital. Many respondents to the ED supported
a goal with broad purposes, a focus that helps make it aspirational. The staff believes that an
aspirational goal will be useful to independence decision makers when they consider auditor
independence issues. The goal also provides a basis for independence decision makers to
consider the benefits and costs associated with both reliable financial information and optimal
capital allocation. For example, allowing auditees to hire individuals previously employed by
their auditing firm—subject to certain safeguards—may increase independence risk to some
extent, but the skills of those individuals also may facilitate the optimal allocation of capital by
helping auditees generate more reliable financial information and by increasing the attractiveness
of the profession to high-quality individuals.
Auditor Independence Concepts6
57.

Paragraphs 14-24 describe three concepts relevant to auditor independence decisions:
a.
threats to auditor independence;
b.
safeguards to auditor independence; and
c.
independence risk.
These concepts are elements of a risk model for auditor independence that the staff believes will
assist independence decision makers in understanding and analyzing auditor independence
issues. In this model, the level of independence risk is a function of the significance of threats
and the effectiveness of safeguards. An auditor is independent when independence risk is at an
acceptably low level, as assessed by a particular independence decision maker. As described in
paragraphs 35-38, the views of well-informed investors and other users should enter into
independence decision makers’ analysis of the level of independence risk and of that level’s
acceptability. Independence decision makers also should consider the basic principle related to
costs and benefits described in paragraphs 31-34 when they assess the acceptability of the level
of independence risk and when they choose among alternative safeguards.
58.
The model acknowledges the importance of materiality by incorporating the significance
of threats and the effectiveness of safeguards. Determining the level of independence risk
requires analyzing the significance of threats to auditor independence posed by a specific
activity, relationship, or other circumstance and the effectiveness of the safeguards that are, or
could be put in place to mitigate or eliminate specific threats, and therefore whether an auditor’s
objectivity would be, or reasonably would appear to well-informed investors and other users to
be, compromised. However, because of the large number of potential threats and safeguards that
are not susceptible to quantification—for example, the impact of family relationships—the staff
concluded that it is preferable to use the more general terms “significance of threats” and
6The categories of threats described in this conceptual framework and its approach of analyzing threats and
safeguards when resolving auditor independence issues are consistent with the systems in use and under
development by standard setters in various places outside the United States, including the United Kingdom
(Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales), Europe (Federation des Experts Comptables
Europeens (FEE) and the European Commission), and internationally (International Federation of
Accountants).
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“effectiveness of safeguards,” rather than “materiality,” which is more frequently associated with
quantitative measures or guidelines. Some threats and safeguards are susceptible to
quantification, however, and independence decision makers may determine that their
significance and effectiveness can be evaluated, in whole or in part, by reference to numeric
benchmarks.
59.
Some respondents to the ED were concerned because two specific threats used frequently
in the independence literature—“acting in the capacity of management” and “having a mutuality
of interests with the client”—were not explicitly included in the ED’s list of threat types. The
staff concluded that the five types of threats described in the ED—self-interest, self-review,
advocacy, familiarity, and intimidation—include those specific threats and are more descriptive
of the general nature of the threats faced by auditors. The staff also believed that “having a
mutuality of interests with the client” can be confusing if it is included as a threat because
auditors and their clients should have certain mutual interests, for example, in reliable financial
reporting.
60.
The conceptual framework defines threats as “pressures and other factors that impair”
rather than those that “may impair” an auditor’s objectivity because pressures and other factors
that do not affect an auditor’s objectivity are not threats.
61.
The staff recognizes that there are many ways to describe safeguards in addition to the
classification described in paragraph 20. For example, safeguards can be described by where
they reside:
a.
safeguards that exist in the environment in which audits are performed, such as:
1.
the value auditing firms and individual auditors place on their reputations;
2.
peer review programs that assess firm-wide compliance with professional
standards and regulatory requirements regarding independence;
3.
general oversight by auditees’ audit committees and boards of directors
concerning compliance with the regulatory requirement that an auditee’s financial
statements be audited by auditors who are independent;
4.
other aspects of corporate governance, including an auditee’s “tone at the
top,” that support the issuance of reliable financial information and auditor
independence;
5.
rules, standards, and codes of professional conduct governing auditors’
behavior issued by public regulatory bodies, such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and state boards of accountancy, and by self-regulatory
bodies, such as the ISB and the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA);
6.
disciplinary actions, and the possibility of such actions, by the SEC, state
boards of accountancy, the AICPA, and others; and
7.
the legal liability faced by auditors and other participants in the capital
markets.
b.
safeguards that exist within auditing firms as part of a firm’s quality controls,
such as:
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1.
maintaining a “tone at the top” that stresses the expectation that auditors
will act in the public interest and the importance of quality audits and auditor
independence;
2.
maintaining a professional environment and culture that supports behavior
of all firm personnel that is consistent with auditor independence;
3.
quality assurance programs that include policies, procedures, and practices
directly related to maintaining auditor independence;
4.
other policies, procedures, and practices, such as those concerning auditee
acceptance and retention, the rotation of engagement management, concurring
partner reviews, and requirements for internal consultation on technical issues;
and
5.
personnel hiring, training, promotion, retention, and reward policies,
procedures, and practices that emphasize the importance of auditor independence,
the potential threats posed by various circumstances that auditors in the firm may
face, and the need for auditors to evaluate their independence with respect to a
specific auditee after considering safeguards in place to mitigate those threats.
62.

Another way of describing safeguards is by their focus:
a.
safeguards that are preventive—for example, an orientation program for newly
hired auditors that emphasizes the importance of independence;
b.
safeguards that relate to threats arising in specific circumstances—for example,
prohibitions against certain employment relationships between auditors’ family members
and auditees;
c.
safeguards that are designed to deter violations of prohibited activities and
relationships—for example, reviews of auditors’ securities portfolios to detect prohibited
investments; and
d.
safeguards whose effects are to deter violations by punishing violators—for
example, revocations of auditors’ licenses by state boards of accountancy.

63.
Safeguards that are mandated by independence decision makers can be described by the
extent to which they restrict activities or relationships that are considered threats to auditor
independence, such as:
a.
absolute prohibition—for example, barring auditors from having any direct
financial investment in any auditees;
b.
permitting the activity or relationship but restricting its extent or form—for
example, a restriction that auditors cannot have material indirect financial interests in
auditees;
c.
permitting the activity or relationship but requiring other policies or procedures
that eliminate or mitigate the threat—for example, the mandatory replacement of an
engagement partner after the partner has spent a certain period of time on a specific audit
engagement to mitigate a familiarity threat; and
d.
permitting the activity or relationship but requiring the auditor to disclose
information about it to the auditee’s management, audit committee, board, or others—for
example, disclosure to an auditee’s audit committee of the nature of all services provided
by the auditor to the auditee and the fees received for such services.
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Basic Principles of Auditor Independence
Considering the Level of Independence Risk and Assessing its Acceptability
64.
The basic principle described in paragraphs 26-30 requires independence decision
makers to analyze threats posed by specific activities, relationships, or other circumstances and
safeguards in place to mitigate those threats. The purpose of that analysis is to consider the level
of independence risk—defined as the likelihood that an auditor’s objectivity would be, or would
reasonably appear to well-informed investors and other users to be, compromised. Because an
auditor’s objectivity cannot be directly observed, and because threats and safeguards will affect,
to different degrees, the ability of individual auditors to make unbiased audit decisions,
independence risk is expressed as a continuum.
65.
As described in paragraph 27, the independence risk continuum extends from one
endpoint, at which compromised objectivity is virtually certain, to another, at which
compromised objectivity is virtually impossible. The ED suggested that the level of
independence risk for a specific activity, relationship, or other circumstance could be described
as being either at one of those endpoints or in one of three defined segments of the continuum.
Some respondents to the ED, however, found the description of the independence risk continuum
confusing and were concerned that the description implied an unrealistic degree of precision. As
a result, the staff simplified the description of the independence risk continuum and suggested
that independence decision makers do not need to identify a specific position on the continuum
but only assess whether that position is acceptably low.
66.
As noted in paragraph 18, the significance of threats to auditor independence may have
both probability and magnitude dimensions. Certain activities, relationships, and other
circumstances may create a high likelihood of auditor bias but the bias may not affect significant
audit decisions. For example, independence decision makers may conclude that the likelihood
would be high that an auditor would be biased in auditing an appraisal performed by a firm
colleague—that is, the unmitigated threat of self-review is significant. If the appraisal involves
an asset that is clearly insignificant to the auditee’s consolidated financial statements, however,
this may result in only an inconsequential increase in the level of independence risk.
67.
The basic principle in paragraph 26 requires independence decision makers, after
considering all of the relevant facts and circumstances, to analyze threats and safeguards and to
reach a conclusion about whether the level of independence risk is acceptably low. The staff
believes that a principle based on achieving the “no independence risk” endpoint of the
independence risk continuum for all threats to auditor independence is unrealistic and, in some
circumstances, may be undesirable. Such a principle would mandate that independence decision
makers adopt safeguards that provide “absolute assurance” of auditor independence, a level of
assurance that audits themselves are not designed to provide. The staff believes that no
safeguard or combination of safeguards can be completely effective in eliminating all
independence risk. The staff also believes that, in some cases, the costs (both direct and indirect)
of attempting to get closer to the “no independence risk” endpoint on the continuum may exceed
the benefits of further reducing independence risk. The staff concluded that the basic principle
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described in paragraphs 26-30, which establishes an objective of reducing independence risk to a
very low level, will help independence decision makers decide whether additional safeguards are
necessary to mitigate threats to auditor independence.
68.
The ED contained two separate basic principles concerning independence risk. The staff
subsequently concluded that it is more useful to develop one basic principle describing the
process independence decision makers should use to evaluate independence risk. As a result, the
basic principle discussed in paragraphs 26-30 includes a three-step process: consider the level of
independence risk by analyzing threats and safeguards, assess whether that level is acceptably
low, and apply appropriate safeguards if it is not.

Considering Benefits and Costs
69.
The staff recognizes the difficulty of identifying and measuring many of the benefits and
costs of auditor independence, including the potential unintended consequences of maintaining
auditor independence. Nevertheless, the staff believes that independence decision makers
should, to the extent possible, weigh both the direct and indirect benefits and costs of safeguards
they are considering. In many cases, independence decision makers will not need to determine
the dollar amount of benefits and costs of a particular safeguard but only whether there are
incremental benefits and costs of that safeguard as compared with others.

Considering Interested Parties’ Views in Addressing Auditor Independence Issues
70.
The ED included a basic principle describing how independence decision makers should
consider the views of interested parties. Some respondents to the ED noted that the basic
principle was not explicit about when and how independence decision makers should consider
the views of various interested parties. The basic principle included in paragraphs 35-38
clarifies that interested parties’ views should be considered at certain places in the decision
making process: when independence decision makers consider the level of independence risk,
when they assess its acceptability, and when they consider the costs and benefits of applying
safeguards. The definitions of auditor independence and of independence risk also have been
changed to specify that independence decision makers should consider the likely views of
reasonable, well-informed investors and other users.
71.
The staff considered three alternative approaches to a basic principle concerning how
beliefs about auditor independence should be included in the standard-setting process: develop
standards that reflect the views of all interested parties; develop standards that reflect the likely
views of reasonable, fully informed investors or some other group or groups of interested parties;
or be informed by interested parties’ views but base standards on the Board’s judgment about
how best to reduce independence risk to an acceptably low level. The staff believes that
adopting either of the first two alternatives as a basic principle would inappropriately restrict the
Board in making independence judgments, especially if those judgments differ from the short
term views of some interested parties, or if interested parties do not appropriately consider costs
and benefits. In addition, because different individuals and groups are likely to have diverse
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views on auditor independence issues, basing decisions on those views is often impossible or
impractical.
72.
The staff believes that a basic principle based on the process described in paragraphs 3538 emphasizes that the Board itself—whose members come from diverse constituencies and are
chosen to represent the public interest based on their experience and integrity—is in the best
position to establish appropriate independence standards. The Board’s due process includes a
thorough evaluation of all available information, including obtaining input from interested
parties through its task forces, reviewing all responses to documents issued for public exposure,
and in other ways. Under the basic principle described in paragraphs 35-38, the Board should
neither ignore interested parties’ views nor base its decisions solely on those views. The
principle of determining independence risk and assessing its acceptability calls for consideration
of the beliefs of well-informed investors and other users of financial information at various
points in the decision-making process. As a result, the Board will consider the views of this
group in light of its own judgment, informed by the views of other interested parties, about the
potential effect of alternatives on the reliability of financial information, audit quality, and the
broader goal of user reliance and optimal capital allocation.
73.
The staff believes that effective communication with all interested parties can help inform
them about the Board’s agenda, the process used to promulgate independence standards, and the
reasoning underlying those standards. The Board provides a variety of opportunities for
interested parties to furnish timely input to it—for example, Board task forces and working
groups include representatives from many organizations, and the Board distributes discussion
memoranda and exposure drafts widely to encourage interested parties to share their views with
the Board. At various stages in its standard-setting process, the Board communicates its views
on the nature of the threats that it believes are posed in the circumstances under consideration
and the reasons why it believes that certain safeguards are the best solution in those
circumstances. The Board also explains the bases for its conclusions, both in ISB standards and
through other media. These and similar efforts by the Board to ensure effective communications
with all interested parties should help increase their confidence in the organizations and
processes involved in ensuring auditor independence as well as in the reliability of the financial
reporting process and in the independence of auditors generally.
74.
The staff believes that when other independence decision makers address auditor
independence issues, they also should consider the views of interested parties. Those
independence decision makers should ask, in their own informed good faith views, whether wellinformed investors and other users would reasonably consider the activities, relationships, or
other circumstances in question as precluding the ability to make unbiased audit decisions.
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